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Soldiers and Money. An Attempt at Reforming
the Customs Service and Reinforcing the
Army in the British North American Colonies
in the Years of 1763–1764
Jaromír Soukup
This study focuses on changes in British colonial policy and politics after the Seven
Years’ War in North America. It deals primarily with the transformation of British eco-
nomic policy towards its colonies. After the Seven Years’ War, the United Kingdom
sought funds to strengthen defence of the newly acquired territories in North Amer-
ica. In 1764 the British parliament approved of the Sugar Act that tightened the customs
service in America. The money raised by this law should have gone to the protection of
the British Empire in North America. The study analyses the reasons for the transfor-
mation of British politics after the Seven Years’ War, as well as the impact of this policy
on the relation between the mother country and its colonies in North America.
[Great Britain; North America; Colonies; Army; Sugar Act of 1764]
The1 end of Seven Years’ War meant for Great Britain not only defeat-
ing France and gaining territories in North America and India, but
also an enormous increase of the national debt. Whereas in 1755 the
state debt amounted to over 72 million pounds, at the beginning of
1763 it reached the sum of 122.6 million pounds. By January 1764 it
had soared by another 7 million.2 However, it was not only the state
debt which was calling for intensified attention from the side of the
 Institute of World History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Nám. J. Palacha 2,
116 38, Prague 1, Czech Republic. E-mail: jaromir.soukup@ff.cuni.cz.
1 This study was published as part of the university program PROGRES Q 09: History
– The key to understanding the globalized world.
2 The interest on debt amounted to more than 4 million pounds, whereas the state
budget was approximately 8million pounds. See also L.H. GIPSON, British Empire X.
Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West 1763–1766, New York 1961, p. 200; E.D. MORGAN
– H.M. MORGAN, The Stamp Act Crisis, Prologue to Revolution, Chapel Hill 1953.
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government as well as that of the King; it was also the question of se-
curity of the newly conquested territories. As early as in September
1762 King George III together with his Prime Minister John Stuart, 3rd
Earl of Bute, planned to increase the numbers of soldiers in Britain, Ire-
land and America by employing more regiments.3 Even after the end
of Seven Years’ War it was still evident that fear of France persisted in
London.
George III selected the army budget of 1749 as his starting point;
which means the budget from the very first peace year after theWar of
the Austrian Succession. The King decided to make up a plan which
would allow him to enlarge the army without exceeding the given
budget. The plan consisted in increasing the number of regiments, but
the number of recruited soldiers would be reduced in all of them in
peace times. Instead, each regiment should have maintained the full
number of officers in4 active service as well as administration, which
would ensure that in a case of emergency5 it would be possible to re-
cruit a necessary number of soldiers quickly enough.
The parliamentary budget committee in charge of approving of fi-
nancial means for the army gathered to a session on 4 March 1763.
The press kept publishing the news of the “most crammed” House of
Commons since commencing the parliamentary session season.6 Gov-
ernment MPs expected that the opposition would attack army expen-
diture. The leading figure of the opposition was Duke of Newcastle.
According to American historian Allen S. Johnson, the state debt of Great Britain
amounted to roughly 137 million pounds. See A. S. JOHNSON, The Passage of the
Sugar Act, in:William and Mary Quarterly (WMQ), 16, 4, 1959, p. 507.
3 J. L. BULLION, Security and Economy: The Bute Administration’s Plans for the
American Army and Revenue, 1762–1763, in:WMQ, 45, 3, 1988, pp. 501–503.
4 Those criticising this policy as well as some historians would accuse the King and
Earl of Bute of trying to intensify their influence by means of patronage, i. e. the
possibility of appointing officers. Robert Middlekauff wrote that officers represented
a substantial support for the King as a number of them were also members of the
House of Commons. See R. MIDDLEKAUF, The Glorious Cause. The American Revolu-
tion 1763–1789, Oxford – New York 1982, p. 51. Another opinion is presented by John
L. Bullion, who argues by means of the King’s letter to his confidant, Earl of Bute, in
which the King clearly rejects such a claim. See J. L. BULLION, The Ten Thousand in
America, in:WMQ, 43, 4, 1986, p. 651.
5 BULLION, Security and Economy, p. 502.
6 P.D.G. THOMAS, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis. The First Phase of the Ameri-
can Revolution, 1763–1767, Oxford 1975, p. 38.
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For the Duke and his allies the main problem, however, did not lie
in safeguarding the new territories against a potential French attack;
they rather saw it in the state of finance. The Duke and his friends
believed that Britain should be helped most by decreasing the num-
ber of soldiers. They viewed as their primary aim refining taxation
policy. This aim of their should have been achieved by means of slash-
ing high taxes, which the government imposed during the war itself
in order to get means for waging it. Easing the tax burden was sup-
posed to contribute to increasing the active trade balance and thus
to securing higher state revenues. Moreover, whereas the tax burden
rested mainly with Great Britain, her colonies had so far contributed
to their mother country with nearly a negligible sum of money. At that
moment British politicians turned their attention towards underhand
practices of the settlers.
According to most politicians the position of Britain as a great
power depended on her naval and trading power – on her effort to
increase foreign trade, thus achieving the active trade balance. This
meant that rival states had to be eliminated, i. e. their goods had to be
imposed high customs duties on, by means of which undesirable com-
petition was to be prevented from. However, smugglers would violate
this system by importing from overseas possessions goods that they
subsequently claimed to be British. At the time of Robert Walpole’s
ruling the British political scene clerks would turn a blind eye to the
problem of smuggling. To a certain degree, it was caused by the fact
that this statesman himself was involved in the contraband trade to a
lesser extent and, as Martin Kovárˇ wrote down, he was no exception
on the British political scene.7 The same applied to the British colonies
in America where tea and molasses trading was affected most.
British ministers were forced to act both due to the lack of finance
in the course of the Seven Years’ War and the news of colonists pro-
viding supplies to enemy bases in the Carribean. Therefore in 1757 the
Ministry of Trade and the Colonial Office initiated extensive investi-
gation which two years later resulted in rather an alarming statement
– that illegal colonial trade had been depriving the mother country of
state revenues, and what is more, it did a lot of damage to war efforts.8
7 M. KOVÁRˇ, RobertWalpole – zrození politika, in:Historický obzor, 12, 1–2, 2001, p. 13.
8 See also T. C. BARROW, Background to the Grenville Program, 1757–1763, in:WMQ,
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Although concluding the peace treaty of 1763 did alleviate fears that
contraband practices of settlers might contribute to strengthening the
enemy forces, the above mentioned investigation was one of the stim-
uli to making the colonial administration more efficient.
The first step of the British cabinet to be taken was the Act of early
1763,9 initiated by George Grenville, First Lord of the Admiralty in
Lord Bute’s cabinet.10 The act was designed to do away with customs
officers’ temptation to accept bribes, allow ships sail without paying
the customs duty, and thus rob the state treasury. For this reason he
stated that one half of the value represented by any confiscated ship
and smuggled goods would be allotted to those customs officers who
had been involved in any disclosure. The act authorized war vessels
officers and their crews to detect any smuggled goods, and tomotivate
them for doing so it stipulated an incentive of the same amount as that
given to customs officers.11 The act only came into force in the colonies
after the Order in Council of 1 June 1763. Shortly afterwards Secre-
tary of State for the Southern Department, 2nd Earl of Egremont, sent
away a circular letter to governors saying that state revenues had gone
down as a result of violating law; the thing was that dishonest traders
had been smuggling goods made or produced abroad, and they had
claimed them to be British. Thus, the state kept losing a lot of money
on customs duty. The new act was supposed to rectify the bad situ-
ation. Egremont informed the governors that captains of British war
ships would be vested with the authority of checking trade vessels
as soon as possible to discover whether they might not be transport-
ing any contraband goods. Furthermore, Egremont announced that
the governors who would be of any assistance in combatting contra-
band trading would win a token of the King’s favour; their failing to
perform such service, on the other hand, was not to be disregarded
either.12
22, 1965, 3rd Series, pp. 93–104; I. R. CHRISTIE – B.W. LABAREE, Empire or Indepen-
dence 1760–1776. A British-American Dialogue on the Coming of the American Revolution,
London 1976, p. 29.
9 GIPSON, p. 202.
10 See also JOHNSON, p. 508; THOMAS, p. 45.
11 GIPSON, pp. 202–203.
12 Ibidem, p. 203.
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However, the whole matter started to be seriously dealt with after
George Grenville became PrimeMinister. The Treasury then studied in
depth the previous reports that they had at their disposal, and found
out that the customs duty returns in North America did not amount
to the sum of money which was expected at all. This clearly pointed to
poor quality of the work customs officers were doing. On 21 July 1763
the Commissioners of Customs dispatched a final report closing their
investigation, in which they claimed that customs proceeds indicated
the existence of huge fraud. Customs collection expenses by far sur-
passed their earnings.13 Some of those problems had arisen as a result
of corrupt practices of customs officers in the colonies. Furthermore,
the Commissioners referred to the report submitted to the Treasury on
10 May 1759.14 At the same time, they handed over three proposals
concerning the matter of improving the given situation.
The first proposal concerned higher customs officials. Those people
were paid quite well, and many of them did not even go to the trou-
ble of leaving for the colonies after they had been appointed. Instead,
they would receive their salaries and live happily in Great Britain.
Those who acted on their behalf in the colonies were paid badly, and
so they were easily susceptible to accepting bribes in order to improve
their financial standing. The Commissioners thus recommended that
the government should make all officials residing within the territory
of Great Britain assume their posts in the colonies; otherwise they
would be deprived of them. The second proposal dealt with the size of
salaries. The Commissioners advised that the government should in-
stead of fixed salaries opt for payments in relation to the percentage of
the amount collected. That way corruption could easily go down; tax
collectors would try to get as high an amount as possible. Thirdly, the
Commissioners proposed that customs duty should be decreased with
selected imported foreign products and crops. This proposal aimed
mainly at lowering the customs duty on molasses from abroad, which
was one of the products smuggled most often to the British colonies
ever. Should the customs duty go down to a sum unfavourable for
13 At the end of 1763 the customs duty proceeds amounted to 1.800 pounds sterling,
while customs administration expenses were estimated at 7.600 pounds sterling.
14 BARROW, p. 94.
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smugglers, proceeds from customs duty were expected to quickly in-
crease.15
On 22 July 1763 was held a meeting of the Treasury which con-
ferred the proposals of the Commissioners of Customs. The meeting
agreed that all the three proposals would be put into practice as soon
as it were possible. The second and third proposals had to be passed
in Parliament, whereas with the first one only a Treasury regulation
would do. Three days later Charles Jenkinson dispatched an order
to the Commissioners of Customs asking them to summon the cus-
toms officials who should have discharged their posts in America but
who were still staying in England. Those officials were to opt between
leaving for America (by the end of August at the latest), or being dis-
missed.16
The decision made by the government immediately stirred up
protests among those tax collectors staying in England. Many of them
hastily wrote out their reasons for being absent from America to the
customs committee. Some of them claimed that they were only stay-
ing in England temporarily, in order to settle their personal matters;
others started complaining of poor health caused by dismal Ameri-
can climate. One official even wrote that after ten years spent in such
unfavourable climate suffered from ill health, with his wife lying on
a death-bed. Nevertheless, he stated that he would rather go back to
America than risk being dismissed, even though this would mean a
certain death for him.17 Still, a number of tax collectors and customs
inspectors did give their lucrative posts up, so as not to have to travel
more than three thousand miles and lose the security and comfort of
their English homes.18 There was a lot of interest in their posts. What is
more, there was a lot of favouritism in play. Influential men would re-
quest those posts for their friends or for their subordinates, sometimes
for unusual reasons.19
15 JOHNSON, pp. 509–510.
16 Cf. MORGAN – MORGAN, p. 23; JOHNSON, p. 510; GIPSON, p. 207; M. JENSEN,
The Founding of a Nation. A History of the American Revolution 1763–1776, Oxford –
New York 1968, pp. 46–47.
17 GIPSON, p. 207.
18 MIDDLEKAUFF, p. 60.
19 Lord Holland asked George Grenville to appoint a certain Irish actor named O’Bryen
to the post of inspector in New York. The point was that the actor had escaped to
New York with his brother’s (i. e. Lord Ilchester’s) daughter. Compare JENSEN, p.
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George Grenville, however, did not stick to this step of his only. At
the end of July 1763 the Treasury sent yet another letter to the Customs
Committee asking the Commissioners of Customs to work out further
proposals elaborating how to improve customs duty collection. The
main question was how to supervise customs service in the colonies
so that revenues would increase.20 Then the Commissioners sent a re-
port to the Treasury claiming that the Molasses Act of 1733 had been
totally ignored in the colonies; they proposed much harsher punish-
ments for smuggling goods, more elaborate ship checks in ports, fines
only payable in pounds of sterling, and not in devaluating local ban-
knotes, as it had been common practice so far. They also warned of the
imperfect work of colonial courts. The Commissioners again pointed
out to a possibility of increasing revenues by means of lowering cus-
toms tariffs on some crops. This should have – according to them –
lessened the temptation to smuggle the crops.21
The Treasury then sent its report on the result of their investiga-
tion and on the steps taken so far to the King, who handed it over
to Privy Council. The council approved of it and issued it as its decree
on 4 October.22 In it the council demanded that all officials and depart-
ments in the colonies concerned cooperate when fighting contraband
trading. Officials should have been assisted by both the army and the
navy, which had already been ordered to use their war ships against
smuggling in July. Commanders-in-chief of the British Army and the
Navy in America were ordered to operate as effectively as possible to
“combat these dangerous practices, and protect tax and customs officers from
criminals trying to contradict administration of justice [. . . ]”.23
Meanwhile secretaries of the Treasury in London were gathering
material on the basis of which the Sugar Act was to be worded. On 9
March 1764 PrimeMinister George Grenville submitted the act during
the annual debate on the budget to the Budgetary Committee of Par-
47.
20 See JOHNSON, p. 510.
21 Cf. Ch.M. ANDREWS, The Colonial Period of American History IV. England’s Commer-
cial and Colonial Policy, New Heaven 1938, pp. 218–219; JOHNSON, p. 511; GIPSON,
pp. 205–206.
22 JENSEN, p. 47.
23 A regulation issued by Privy Council of 4 October 1763, in: M. JENSEN (ed.), English
Historical Documents IX. American Colonial Documents to 1776, London – New York
1955, p. 639.
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liament. The Prime Minister announced, however, that customs rev-
enues would not suffice for covering all the army expenses in Amer-
ica. According to him, it was necessary to impose yet another tax, and
that is why he mentioned a stamp-duty act which was just being pre-
pared. Grenville was in the advantage as he did not have to fear the
opposition. Many of them had left the House full of disenchantment
in February 1764, after losing in the question of legitimacy to issue
general warrants of arrest.24 One of the MPs who had left the House
for the rest of the session period was also William Pitt Senior. With-
out his “magnetic” leadership the opposition had shrunk to a minimal
number, and thus the government found it very easy to push the act
through.25
The Sugar Act should have come into force on 29 September 1764.26
After it was published it received a lot of criticism from the side of
New England and “Middle” colonies immediately, as it affected their
trading mainly. In this relation it necessary to remark that it was nov-
elty in British legal practice. All trade legislature so far had focussed
on regulating trade with foreign states in favour of Great Britain. Rev-
enues coming from them represented more of a “side product” than
an intention. Now it was the other way round. As the act preamble
24 In 1762 MP John Wilkes (1725–1797) founded the newspaper called The North Briton,
which would attack the Bute as well as the Grenville administrations. In April 1763 it
also came down on the King’s speech, in which the sovereign praised the Paris Peace
of 1763. Wilkes lambasted the King’s speech referring to the peace as “foul”. The
Grenville administration intervened and issued the so-called general warrant (which
did not state any particular names, and thus more persons could be arrested). Wilkes
together with all his colleagues from The North Briton who had taken part in attack-
ing the King were arrested. However, Wilkes had friends in Parliament, and these
raised a debate on the lawfulness of issuing general warrants of arrest. They man-
aged to free Wilkes, but he did not spend much time at liberty. At the beginning of
1764, when Wilkes was staying in Paris, the government made an attempt at Wilkes’
disbarring from Parliament for publishing seditious pamphlets, and it did succeed.
The opposition counterattacked the Grenville administration on the grounds of is-
suing general warrants of arrest. The Prime Minister defended himself stating that
there existed precedents for their issuing. Ultimately the Government – after a long
debate held on 18 February 1764 – won through.
25 JOHNSON, p. 513.
26 Historians either call it “Sugar Act” or “Stamp Act”. It can be found in many edi-
tions, e. g., JENSEN (ed.), pp. 643–648, E. S. MORGAN, Prologue to Revolution. Sources
and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764–1766, Chapel Hill 1959, pp. 4–8, its full
version being in: www.historycarper.com/resources/docs/sugaract.htm [2017–06–
10].
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stated, themain intent was to get through customs duty in the colonies
financial means “for defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and
securing”.27 The act aimed at solving three important issues: firstly, it
imposed new customs duties, secondly, it tightened up the work of
customs service, and thirdly, it solved the chaos in jurisdiction of the
colonial courts.
The main products the act was called after had become French mo-
lasses and sugar. The new act extended the validity of the Molasses
Act of 1733,28 however, instead of the customs duty amounting to six
pence per gallon it decreased it to one half. On the other hand, cus-
toms duty on foreign refined sugar increased from five shillings per
hundred gallons to one pound and seven shillings.29 The sugar cus-
toms duty rather reflected its protection from foreign competition.
Another important product affected by the legislation change was
wine, which was imported to America especially from the Azores,
Spain and Portugal. Until 1764 anybody could import wine freely,
without any protective duty, as it did not compete with any similar
British product. The Sugar Act imposed a new import duty of seven
pounds per ship tonne (1.132 m3) provided that merchants would im-
port it direct, and ten shillings a ship tonne if it were imported via
Great Britain. The situation was, however, far more complicated in re-
ality. Should a captain of the ship choose to sail via London, he had to
pay the British import duty amounting to seventy shillings per ship
tonne of wine, and then an import duty of ten shillings in America.
Moreover, expenses for a longer voyage and reloading goods in Lon-
don meant that the price was the same as that for direct import and
paying seven pounds of import duty in America.30 Apparently, this
measure should have stimulated the consumption of rum.31 Its in-
creased consumption meant more demand for molasses, and as the
British sugar islands were not able to satisfy it merchants had to im-
port molasses from the French sugar islands. This molasses earned
for the state treasury more because it was liable to a higher customs
27 JENSEN (ed.), p. 644.
28 Articles 4 and 5 of the Sugar Act, ibidem.
29 Articles 1 and 6 of the Sugar Act, ibidem, pp. 644–645.
30 O.M. DICKERSON, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution, Philadelphia
1963, pp. 175–177.
31 GIPSON, p. 226.
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duty. Moreover, the rum produced in the British colonies had won a
monopoly in the local markets.32 The list of foreign goods newly du-
tiable had been entered by indigo, European luxury fabric materials
imported from Britain such as cambric, and Indian fabric materials
like silk and caliko.33 Among the enumerated articles, which could
only be exported to Great Britain and her American colonies, were
included coffee, allspice, hide, coconuts, whale bones, crude silk and
potash.
Another significant initiative that the act introduced was tightening
up the customs service and its operation. Customs procedures in force
so far dated back to the last third of the seventeenth century, mainly
to the Navigation Act of 1696, and to the other related acts of the first
half of the eighteenth century.34 The reality before 1764 looked like
this: After a captain of a big merchant ship reached an American har-
bour, he submitted a ship registration certificate to the customs duty
collector. The certificate had to include the confirmation saying the
ship was built in Great Britain or her colonies, and the captain and
three quarters of the ship’s crew were British subjects. As far as goods
from Great Britain or from the British colonies in America were con-
cerned, the captain of the ship had to hand over a bill of lading to the
duty collector, which stated the place of loading the goods. When the
ship arrived from a different territory, the captain of the ship had to
produce two bills of lading: The first of them was kept by the collec-
tor as a proof; the second one had to state precise specification of the
cargo. The customs duty collector used the second bill of lading for
calculating the duty, and he handed it to an official who then checked
whether it really corresponded to the ship cargo. When the cargo com-
plied with the bill the document was signed, provided with a seal and
entered in the accounting book.35
32 Article 18 of the Sugar Act. JENSEN (ed.), p. 645.
33 Ibidem, p. 644.
34 This period was very distinctly treated by the American historian Michael Kammen.
see M. KAMMEN, Empire and Interest. The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercan-
tilism, New York – Toronto 1970. On how customs services worked and on its tight-
ening up see ANDREWS, p. 20. After 1764 see in detail A. S. MARTIN, The King’s
Customs: Philadelphia, 1763–1774, in:WMQ, 5, 2, 1948, pp. 202–203.
35 V.D. HARRINGTON, The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution, Gloucester
(Mass.) 1964, pp. 245–246.
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As far as ships sailing from the colonial ports were concerned, the
customs documentation was more complicated. Before a captain re-
ceived the certificate of customs clearance before leaving a port, he
had had to supply a manifest of the articles he intended to export. Af-
ter loading everything he had to take an oath that the goods he was
transporting in the hold corresponded to those on the manifest. Pro-
vided he wanted to load the goods which the laws ordered to be only
exported to Great Britain and her colonies, he had to place a security
deposit and have one more guarantor apart from himself, so that he
would not unload them anywhere else than in Great Britain or an-
other British colonial port.36 Customs officials would return the se-
curity only after producing a certificate from the port of destination.
The security was forfeited unless the certificate were delivered after a
year and a half from depositing it. Failing to deliver it, apart from the
forfeited security, would demonstrate contraband practices, and the
captain had then to give an account of his acts before the court.37
After the Sugar Act was passed the situation became very compli-
cated administratively. One of the articles of the act stipulated that
before loading the ship the captain or the owner of the ship had to col-
lect a permit entitling him to loading the goods at the customs office.
Before the ship sailed off her captain was obliged to collect a manifest
of cargo authorized by the customs officer and furnished with a seal.
The list had to describe the quality and quantity of the goods, desig-
nation of each shipment “with the merchants names by whom shipped and
to whom consigned”. Provided that it was necessary to pay export or
import customs duties, the captain had to document in which port he
had done so and to whom he had paid it.38 In the destination port the
captain had to hand over those documents to an authorized customs
official. Another official checked then whether the enumerated goods
fell in with those the ship was carrying. Only then could the goods be
unshipped; and again an official in charge would be supervising. After
the goods were landed, the customs collector determined the customs
36 Before 1707, i. e. before concluding a union with Scotland, the only ports on the
British Isles the captain could unload the cargo were in England, Wales, or in
Berwick-upon-Tweed. Thus it had been determined in the Navigation Act of 1660.
See JENSEN (ed.), p. 356.
37 HARRINGTON, pp. 246–247.
38 Section 29 of the Sugar Act. JENSEN (ed.), p. 647.
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duty amount, and after its paying the goods were transferred to the
consignees.39 Should the captain load any goods without being enti-
tled to do so and the ship sailed off without the manifest of the cargo
or the manifest did not correspond to the cargo, the goods were con-
fiscated. The law would authorize customs officials to stop all ships
within the distance of two nautical miles from the sea coast, to inspect
the goods and, if need be, seize those missing on the manifest.40
Moreover, ship captains had to place four security deposits instead
of one, committing themselves to not exporting the goods to prohib-
ited territories, or to not loading such goods fraudulently. The first
security deposit, the one for goods only assigned to exports to Great
Britain and her colonies, had already existed. Other security deposits
concerned lumber and iron, which did not belong in “prohibited
goods”, but still they could only be exported to Great Britain hence-
forward.41 The last security deposit referred to other items of sale.
Into that category also fell molasses from abroad, which could – un-
like other articles mentioned in this section – only be imported to the
British or colonial ports.42 Whatever the captain might have loaded
then, he had to always have with him a certificate proving that a se-
curity deposit had been placed. Providing that he was transporting a
variety of goods, he had to produce more certificates.
The next article of the act was meant to stop smuggling molasses.
It should have been made clear in the future which molasses came
from the British sugar islands and which from the French ones. Eve-
rybody wanting to transport molasses from the British islands in the
Caribbean Sea, had to first secure an affidavit from the place of load-
ing, which was signed by the Justice of the Peace. The declaration
should have included the description of the quality of the articles, their
value, and the name of the island and plantation from where they had
been obtained. The captain of the ship had to then go with such a dec-
laration to the customs office, where the comptroller would inspect
the goods and grant them with a certificate furnished with his signa-
ture and seal. Apart from this, the customs official made a copy of the
declaration, which he had to send to the destination port within thirty
39 MARTIN, p. 202.
40 Section 29 of the Sugar Act. JENSEN (ed.), p. 647.
41 Article 28 of the Sugar Act, ibidem, p. 646.
42 Article 23 of the Sugar Act, ibidem.
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days. Unless he did so he was to be given the penalty of five pounds.43
If the captain did not have the mentioned documents all the molasses
he was carrying was cleared as French.
The regulations listed above mostly impacted trading both on the
coast and between the colonies even though they had not been primar-
ily focussed on impeding it. Customs officials misinterpreted some
sections of the Sugar Act, and with the help of the navy they “clamped
down” on this trade too.44 The most common items of export on the
coast were wheat and other types of grain, meat, dairy products, and
lumber. Those goods were loaded onto ships in docks, which were
even situated a few tens of miles off the ports where customs authori-
ties had their seats. Until then merchants had loaded as many articles
as possible and sailed to the nearest ports with a customs house; there
their goods had been submitted to all customs procedures; afterwards
they had been allowed to continue to the ports of their destination.
According to sections 23 and 29 of the Sugar Act, however, each mer-
chant had to secure a permit entitling them to load strictly qualified
goods beforehand, and place a security deposit. This meant that they
had to gather all the goods in advance. Then they set off to a customs
house situated a few tens of miles away, where they obtained appro-
priate documents. Only after that could they start loading goods, and
then they sailed again to the customs house because of clearance. Each
passage was thus longer, its costs being higher. It was very difficult for
merchants to put together an exact manifest of articles as many times
they did not know until the last minute what goods they would be
transporting, or how many of them would be on board.45
Furthermore, the act also stipulated punishments for violating the
given rules. Among them were, for instance, storing goods in badly
labelled cases, customs duty evasion, falsifying documents, importing
or exporting non-permitted goods (all such goods were to be seized).
The captain, the owner of the ship as well as all who would be assist-
ing in such illegal practices were obligated to pay a fine amounting
to treble the amount of the value of the seized goods. Furthermore,
the customs official could seize “all ships, horses and other cattle, and
43 Article 20 of the Sugar Act, ibidem, pp. 645–646.
44 MIDDLEKAUFF, p. 66.
45 Cf. DICKERSON, p. 181; B. KNOLLENBERG,Origin of the American Revolution: 1759–
1766, New York 1965, pp. 164–165.
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other means of transport used while loading, unloading, removing and trans-
porting the given goods [. . . ]”.46 Whoever attempted to bribe a customs
official and was disclosed, they had to pay a fine of fifty pounds. Eve-
ry customs officer who accepted a bribe or falsified documents had to
pay a fine of five hundred pounds for their offence, and what’s more,
they were found incompetent to provide any services for the British
king.47
The last part of the Sugar Act dealt with judicial procedures and
courts of Admiralty in the British colonies.48 In 1763 there existed el-
even vice-Admiralty courts in the colonies, whose jurisdiction in the
commercial and fiscal spheres was the same as that of common law
courts. Judges were chosen from the ranks of leading colonial lawyers
by the governor. Whenever a customs officer had a feeling that law
had been violated he could – based on his suspicion – transfer the case
to the vice-Admiralty court of the given colony. However, the accused
merchants would take advantage of legal loops and gaps in legisla-
tion to transfer the trials to common law courts, where the members
of the jury were composed of their friends and where the trial often
resulted in overruling the decision of the vice-Admiralty court, and
46 Articles 36 and 37 of the Sugar Act, in full version in: www.historycarper.com/
resources/docs/sugaract.htm [2017–06–10].
47 Article 38 of the Sugar Act, ibidem.
48 In England Admiralty courts already existed in the Middle Ages in order to decide
cases of piracy and robbery at sea, and in the cases of commercial law. Unlike com-
mon law courts, these Admiralty courts did not have a jury. That is why their cases
and efforts at extending their competence were often under the supervision of com-
mon law courts, which by keeping an eye on them tried to prevent them from vi-
olating the right of the English citizens for a trial by jury. In the British colonies in
America the Admiralty courts had not existed until the end the 17 century though.
The cases that would fall under their jurisdiction in England were decided on by
individual governors in the colonies, their councils, and later on by common law
courts. It was the Navigation Act of 1696 which introduced the Admiralty courts
to the colonies, and it even granted them with more powers for dealing with com-
mercial disputes than courts in England had. Due to imperfect wording of the act,
common law courts in the colonies found ways of neglecting the courts, or at least
restricting their jurisdiction. Cf. D. S. LOVEJOY, “Rights Imply Equality”: The Case
Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–1776, in: J. P. GREENE (ed.), The
Reinterpretation of the American Revolution 1763–1789, Westport 1979, pp. 183–187;
E. CHANNING, A History of the United States, Vol. II, A Century of Colonial History
1660–1760, New York 1930, pp. 277–279.
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in the verdict of not guilty.49 Moreover, the acquitted merchant very
often sued a customs official who had confiscated his vessel to gain
compensatory damages and the reimbursement of the loss of profit.
Many customs officers got into such troubles then.50
This practice should have changed with adopting the new legisla-
tion. Customs officers could submit their cases to any vice-Admiralty
court in America. There should have been one more vice-Admiralty
court, the jurisdiction of which would apply to all the colonies.51 This
court was to have identical jurisdiction with those of already existing
vice-Admiralty courts, and it was not to serve as a court of appeal.
Soon afterwards such a court was established in the town of Hali-
fax, Nova Scotia, i. e. far away from where “local pressure” might im-
pede its work.52 An appeal from a decision of this court could only be
lodged with the Supreme Court of Admiralty residing in London.
Another regulation repealed the provision of the “presumption of
innocence”, so that a merchant under prosecution had to prove his be-
ing innocent, which made the whole matter far more complicated.53
In addition, the defendant had to cover all the expenses of the judicial
trial even if he were innocent. The injured merchant or the owner of
the ship could, however, apply to the court to sue a customs officer for
the reimbursement of the damages. Despite this, he was not entitled
to receive any compensation, providing the judge issued a document
saying that the given officer had had a “probable reason” for seizing
the ship and its cargo. Provided that the customs officer or the judge
delivered the confiscated goods back without the case being heard be-
fore the court, the injured party could be granted with compensation
damages up to 2 pence. The fines for officers who would seize any
49 Cf. GIPSON, p. 228; KNOLLENBERG, p. 166.
50 In 1760 the Boston customs officer Cradock had a proof that the vessel named Sarah,
whose owner was John Ervin, was involved in smuggling. That’s why he seized both
the ship and the goods, and he handed the case over to the vice-Admiralty court. The
court decided he was guilty, and it sold the confiscated ship and the goods for 412
pounds. However, Ervin succeeded in having his case transferred to the common law
court, which then decided in his favour, and ordered that Cradock had to reimburse
the loss amounting to 600 pounds. Cradock lodged an appeal with the High Court
of Massachusetts, but he did not succeed. See GIPSON, pp. 227–228.
51 Article 41 of the Sugar Act. JENSEN (ed.), p. 648.
52 In May 1764 British lawyer William Spry was appointed judge; he then commenced
hearings of disputes in court in October 1764.
53 Article 45 of the Sugar Act. JENSEN (ed.), p. 648.
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goods without reason should not have exceeded one shilling.54 If the
merchant or the owner of the ship who had sued a customs officer
discontinued court proceedings before hearing, or when the court de-
cided to his detriment, he had to cover treble the amount of the court
proceedings costs to the defendant.55
It is worth pointing out that whereas Grenville intended to intro-
duce law and order in the colonies the result was, however, compli-
cated administration and chaos. On the one hand, the government
were not able to – or they may not have even wanted to – get to know
of well-informed opinions of those whowere conversant with the situ-
ations in the colonies (among them were especially merchants or rep-
resentatives of the colonies in London). On the other hand, though,
some contemporaries, mainly the colonists from continental colonies,
ascribed this development to the influence of MPs from the British
“sugar” islands, who they despised from the bottom of their hearts.
Soon the customs officers learnt how to make use of their powers
for unjust enrichment. That was mainly happening in the time after
1767. Oliver M. Dickerson called it the “era of customs blackmailing”.
Thus, customs officers contributed to a large degree to growing hatred
among the colonists towards Great Britain.
54 Article 46 of the Sugar Act, ibidem.
55 Article 47 of the Sugar Act, ibidem.
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